This essay focuses on a specific behavior what dynamics lie.the role of deliberation in each, and the normative criteria appropriate to each.
ne cannot always tell by looking at a specific behavior what dynamics lie behind it. Yet analyzing each form separately makes it possible to identify the underlying power relation in each form, the role of deliberation in each, and the normative criteria appropriate to each. These normative criteria are goals toward which to strive (“regulative ideals”), not standards that can be fully met. Conceiving of democratic legitimacy as a spectrum and not a The difference between representation and direct democracy creates a need for norms designed particularly for democratic representation.
Yet democratic representation comes in different forms, with norms appropriate to each. 1 Although deliberative forms of direct democracy can be. It is effective methods of democratic governance in many circumstances. This representative forms of democracy have their own use. This functioning not just as “transmission belts” for constituent opinion (Schwartz 1988; see also Achen 1978, 476, onstintability theory incorporates two analytically separable strands, usually intertwined. In the first, accountability means only that the representative has an obligation to explain
or her past actions, regardless of the system of sanctioning (e.g., Behn 2001, 220 n. 12, and Guttman and Thompson 1996). The second focuses only on the capacity for imposing sanctions for past behavior (e.g. Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999, 8–10). See Fearon 1999, 55, and Goodin 1999. This analysis employs the second meaning.
with the voter as principal, statically conceived, trying to exercise power over the representative as agent.3 Promissory representation works normatively through the explicit and implicit promises that the elected representative makes to the electorate. It works prudentially through the sanction the voter exercises at the next election (Time 3). That sanction is a reward or punishment for acting or failing to act according to the promise made at the previous election (Time 1). Both normatively and prudentially, the electoral audit at Time 3 focuses on whether or not the promise
firstly, be sure