This essay focuses on The body of the paper.should be no more than four pages including your specific 6 recommendations supported with your strategic interpretation of your industry and competitive analysis.

The body of the paper

should be no more than four pages including your specific 6 recommendations supported with your strategic interpretation of your industry and competitive analysis. In addition, the paper should include appendices, tables, and/or graphs containing your industry and competitive analysis. These graphics must be integrated into the document with labels and captions. Hand-drawn or hand-colored charts or tables are unacceptable.

Number the pages.  The reader of the report is your instructor; therefore, this is a non-sensitive document since the reader is not sensitive to the information. The bottom line for the document and for individual sections or paragraphs must be easy to find.

Provide small chunks of information, with clear logical examples.

The style should be business, conversational, and powerful.We study strategic communication when the sender can ináuence the receiverís understanding of messagesíequilibrium meaning. We focus on a ìpure
persuasionî setting, in which the informed sender wants the uninformed receiver to always choose ìacceptî. The senderís strategy maps each state of Nature to a distribution over pairs consisting of: (i) a multi-dimensional message, and (ii) a ìdictionaryîthat credibly discloses the state-dependent distribution of some of the messsageís components. The receiver does not know the
senderís strategy by default; he can only interpret message components that
are covered by the dictionary he is provided with. We characterize the senderís

optimal persuasion strategy and show that full persuasion is possible when the

prior on the acceptance state exceeds a threshold that quickly decreases with
message dimensionality. We extend our analysis to situations where interpretation of messages is done by a third party with uncertain preferences, and
explore alternative notions of ìdictionariesî.
Financial support by ERC Advanced Investigator grant no. 692995 is gratefully acknowledged.
We thank Xiaosheng Mu and seminar audiences at Columbia, Penn and the Warwick Economic
In this paper we revisit the basic sender-receiver model of strategic communication and depart from the assumption that the receiver is fully capable of interpreting
equilibrium messages.

We focus on a pure persuasion setting (as in Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006)

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