This essay focuses on the dyadic criteria appropriate.None of these more recently recognized forms meets the criteria

the dyadic criteria appropriate

Along with the traditional “promissory” form of representation, empirical political scientists have recently analyzed several new forms, called here “anticipatory,” “gyroscopic,” and “surrogate” representation. None of these more recently recognized forms meets the criteria for democratic accountability developed for promissory representation, yet each generates a set of normative criteria by which it can be judged. These criteria are systemic, in contrast to the dyadic criteria appropriate for promissory representation. They are deliberative rather than aggregative. They are plural rather than singular.

Over the past two decades empirical political scientists have developed increasingly sophisticated descriptions of how American legislators relate to their constituents. Yet although the empirical work has often been motivated by normative convictions that one way of relating is better than another, the normative theory of what constitutes “good” representation has not kept pace with current empirical findings.

This paper seeks to narrow the gap.

The traditional model of representation focused on the idea that during campaigns representatives made promises to constituents, which they then kept or failed to keep. I call this promissory representation. In addition, empirical work in the last 20 years has identified at least three other forms of representation, which I call “anticipatory,” “gyroscopic,” and “surrogate” representation.

Anticipatory representation

flows directly from the idea of retrospective voting: Representatives focus on what they think their constituents will approve at the next election, not on what they promised to do at the last election. In gyroscopic representation, the representative looks within, as a basis for action, to conceptions of interest, “common sense,” and principles derived in part from the representative’s own background. Surrogate representation occurs when legislators represent constituents outside their own districts. These are all legitimate forms of representation. None, however, meets the criteria for democratic accountability developed for promissory representation. I argue that the appropriate normative criteria for judgJane Mansbridge is Adams Professor, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 (jane mansbridge@harvard.edu). This paper has evolved over time.

Most recently I am grateful

for the suggestions of Douglas Arnold, David Brady, Martha Minow.  Mark Moore, Dennis Thompson, and participants in seminars at Center. It is  for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Princeton University, the University. It is  of California Los Angeles, Stanford University, and the University of Toronto.

For excellent suggestionsof representation are systemic, in contrast to the dyadic criteria appropriate for promissory representation. The criteria are almost all deliberative rather than aggregative. The concepts of representation implied by recent. The  empirical work do not have an obvious relation to the earlier dichotomy. In practice, representative behavior will often mix several of these forms. O